Pace Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 3 After Gender?: Examining International
Justice Enterprises

Article 5

June 2011

Human Rights, Sex, and Gender: Limits in Theory and Practice
Lara Stemple
UCLA School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lara Stemple, Human Rights, Sex, and Gender: Limits in Theory and Practice, 31 Pace L. Rev.
824 (2011)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Human Rights, Sex, and Gender:
Limits in Theory and Practice
Lara Stemple*
At the Pace Law Review Symposium entitled After Gender:
Examining International Justice Enterprises, I was delighted to
participate on one of the four panel “conversations” along with
Bridget Crawford (Pace), Suzanne Goldberg (Columbia), Scott
Long (Harvard), and Carole Vance (Columbia). Refreshingly,
rather than the typical fifteen-minute panel presentations,
panelists were invited to converse around a theme; some of us
spoke beforehand, together with organizers Darren Rosenblum
(Pace) and Janet Halley (Harvard), to map out the directions
our conversation might take. Our panel’s theme was christened
Human Rights Beyond Sex and Gender.
As I reflect on the unfolding of that conversation, it occurs
to me that a more accurate though surely less snappy title
would have been “Human Rights Beyond Sex and Gender as
Currently Rendered in International Lawmaking.” In my view,
a project no less ambitious than the development of a body of
international human rights law applicable to all people
demands thoughtful consideration of gender. The problem is
that when lawmaking pen has finally met paper, the outcome
has been distressingly limited.
I focus my comments here on the role of sexual violence in
international law, both because it is a topic on which my
advocacy practice has focused, and because sexual violence
represents the central issue around which women-focused
international law-making has coalesced in recent decades.1
My theoretical interest in issues concerning gender and
sexual violence originates from my practical experience as a

* Director of Graduate Studies and Director of the Health and Human
Rights Law Project at UCLA School of Law.
1. See Alice M. Miller, Sexuality, Violence Against Women, and Human
Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection, 7 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS., no. 2, 2004 at 16.
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human rights lawyer. Working for different women’s rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), I routinely employed
a range of international human rights instruments as tools to
advocate against the sexual and reproductive subordination of
women and girls. Later, I served as the director of the human
rights organization Just Detention International (JDI), which
works to end sexual violence in prisons, jails, and immigration
detention. Because approximately 91 percent of prisoners are
men,2 I moved from advocacy concerning issues affecting
mostly women to advocacy concerning an issue affecting mostly
men. In so doing, I was struck by how few tools were at my
disposal when the victims of sexual abuse were male.
Indeed, the instruments that address sexual violence the
most comprehensively exclude men. Beyond the limited utility
of the instruments, I found that this sex-based framing
reinforced an us-versus-them dualism that was generally
useless and frequently counterproductive. Men’s rights
advocates latched on to messages about prisoner rape as proof
that feminists were wrong about rape. Likewise, some
feminists at rape crisis centers were at first openly resistant to
serving male prisoner rape victims. Gender nonconforming
people, who are frequently victimized in prisons, did not fit
comfortably within the essentialist two-sex binary presented in
the instruments.
Instead of belonging to any one constituency, the
phenomenon of rape is instead part of a larger whole, related,
of course, to the exercise of domination, the violation of bodily
integrity, and the subjugation of its victims. And, yes, rape is
almost always about gender, which is not to say it is always
about women.
Feminist approaches that value equality and inclusion,
that interrogate structural hierarchies, and that examine
intersecting forms of oppression have proved useful. Other
“feminist” approaches resting upon a women-versus-men
2. World
Prison
Brief,
INT’L
CTR.
FOR
PRISON
STUDIES,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=190
(last visited Aug. 3, 2011). Just Detention International now works in
multiple countries, but when I worked there it was focused only on the
United States. This is therefore U.S. data.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5

2

826

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

perspective have been untenable; ideology too often trumps
evidence, and alternative perspectives seem unwelcome.
Neither I nor most scholars who seek to challenge the sexbased certainties embedded in international law advocate for
an erasure of gender considerations. Undoing rape requires
thorough attention to gender it all its forms. But despite
assurances like these, advocate friends and law students I
teach who are exposed to the academic literature critical of
current approaches often fret that the critiques threaten to
undo hard-won progress by women’s rights movements.
Others ask, quite rightly, how movements for
transformative gender change can ever describe inequality
(“women are victims”) without re-inscribing sex-based
stereotypes (“women are victims”). It simply cannot be that all
advocacy for gender equality actually reinforces women’s
inequality. The problem lies not with the advocacy per se, but
with the approach as currently articulated in international law.
International law’s approach to violence against women
has been problematized by many at the Symposium, including
but not limited to these participants: Karen Engle has
questioned “the assumption that women who have been raped
in wartime have been destroyed.”3 Ratna Kapur has argued
that “victimization rhetoric has reinforced an imperialist
response toward women in the developing world” by
representing them “as thoroughly disempowered, brutalized,
and victimized: a representation that is far from liberating for
women.”4 Carole Vance and Alice Miller have argued that the
preference for “innocent” victims stems from the desire to
create appealing advocacy messages, but risks leaving other
victims out, serving to reinforce hierarchical norms of sexual
privilege.5
I hope to contribute to this ongoing dialogue my own
concerns about the problematic practical and theoretical
3. Karen Engle, Judging Sex in War, 106 MICH. L. REV. 941, 942 (2008).
4. Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the
“Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18 (2002).
5. Alice M. Miller & Carole S. Vance, Sexuality, Human Rights, and
Health, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., no. 2, 2004 at 5, 11.
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implications of the body of international law which assumes
that sexual violence is something that befalls only women and
girls. Below, I discuss four limitations inherent in the current
approach.
I. Conflating the Terms “Gender” and “Women”
To the extent that we wish to acknowledge the limitations
of identity categories while nevertheless deploying them
strategically to advance equality-oriented rights claiming, as
Suzanne Goldberg described on our panel, we need, at the very
least, working definitions that are not nonsensical. We cannot
move “beyond sex and gender” before arriving at the difference
between sex and gender.6
In the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women’s General Recommendation 19,
for example, “gender based violence” is “violence that is
directed against a woman, because she is a woman, or that
affects women disproportionately.”7 No room is left for
gendered violence that harms men, a glaring omission
considering that male victims of sexual violence are routinely
feminized, while their perpetrators maintain a dominant,
masculinized role. As I have explored in detail elsewhere, the
human rights cannon repeatedly conflates sex and gender,
thereby limiting state accountability to acts of gender-based
violence against one sex.8
Meanwhile, international criminal law, specifically in the

6. In the Oxford English Dictionary, “sex” is defined as “[e]ither of the
two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male and female respectively;
the males or the females (of a species, etc., esp. of the human race) viewed
collectively.” 15 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 107 (2d ed. 1989). The Oxford
English Dictionary states that “gender” in modern, especially feminist use is
“often intended to emphasize the social and cultural, as opposed to the
biological, distinctions between the sexes.” 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
428 (2d ed. 1989).
7. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General
Recommendation 19: Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 29,
1992).
8. See Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
605 (2009).
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form of the Rome Treaty establishing the International
Criminal Court, set out to define gender for the first time in an
international treaty. The bland and still confusing result—“two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society”9 at least
includes both sexes as well as social context, if only as a
secondary modifier. Notably, it was women’s rights NGOs that
attempted to advance a more sophisticated and still quite
workable definition of gender: “socially constructed differences
between men and women and the unequal power relationships
that result.”10
But human rights law fares worse than international
criminal law, with gender typically assumed to be something
relevant only to women and girls. This not only erases
opportunities to understand gender as relative, but it prohibits
the application of law to situations that do not follow
traditional gender scripts.
The most comprehensive and conscientious United
Nations’ (UN) definition of gender I have seen is as follows:
Gender: refers to the social attributes and
opportunities associated with being male and
female and the relationships between women
and men and girls and boys, as well as the
relations between women and those between
men. These attributes, opportunities and
relationships are socially constructed and are
learned through socialization processes. They are
context/time-specific and changeable. Gender
determines what is expected, allowed and valued
in a woman or a man in a given context. In most
societies there are differences and inequalities
between women and men in responsibilities
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and
control over resources, as well as decision9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(3), opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
10. Pam Spees, Women’s Advocacy in the Creation of the International
Criminal Court: Changing the Landscapes of Justice and Power, 28 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1243, 1244 n.22 (2003).
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making opportunities. Gender is part of the
broader socio-cultural context. Other important
criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class,
race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.11
Unfortunately, this definition is currently located on the UN
Women website, not in a formal instrument.
II. Explicit Exclusion of Male Victims
So-called women’s issues were virtually ignored in the
early decades of the post-World War II human rights
movement. In the 1980s and 1990s, when significant attention
was finally paid to women’s vulnerability to human rights
violations—not infrequently in the form of anti-rape
language—men were consequently overlooked. This exclusion
of men and boys can therefore be understood in its historical
context, but the continuation of the exclusion runs counter to
important findings about male victimhood.
As has been well documented by researchers, men and
boys have been sexually abused in large numbers in prison
cells, on battlefields, in church rectories, and elsewhere. Of
course, varied definitions and methodologies limit ease of
comparison, but one analysis of 120 prevalence studies
concluded that 3 percent of men worldwide have been raped in
their lifetime, as compared to 13 percent of women.12
One can locate over one hundred uses of the term “violence
against women”—a definition that of course includes sexual
violence—in UN treaties, general comments, resolutions, and
consensus documents.13 Most of these instruments exclude
men, especially those that insist upon the most comprehensive
remedies to address sexual abuse. Instruments such as the
11. OSAGI
Gender
Mainstreaming,
UN
WOMEN,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions (last visited Aug.
3, 2011).
12. See Brian H. Spitzberg, An Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Sexual
Aggression Victimization and Perpetration, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 241, 245
(1999).
13. Stemple, supra note 8, at 618 (internal citation omitted).
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2000 Security Council Resolution 1325,14 and the related
resolutions adopted in the decade that followed, imagine
wartime sexual violence as a danger irrelevant to men.
Resolution 1325 was the first of its kind, and it focuses on the
sexual abuse of “women and girls.” The resolutions that
followed (1694(2006), 1820(2008), 1888(2009), 1889(2009),
1960(2010)) were broadened to include “women and children”—
indicating some attention was paid to moving beyond 1325’s
limitations—but each continued to exclude men. This exclusion
cannot be squared with evidence, for example, from Liberia,
which found that 32 percent of male combatants had
experienced conflict-related sexual violence.15
A comprehensive gendered analysis of sexual violence has
much to contribute to our understanding about, for instance,
why men in prison who are slight, young, and effeminate are
disproportionately targeted for rape. Such an analysis is
similarly essential to critiquing the humiliating aims of forced
fellatio and performative incest during wartime. It is also
seemingly critical to our understanding of the way in which
male survivors of sexual abuse often feel emasculated and
ashamed—with a resulting silence that enables the ongoing
failure of advocacy groups, the media, and governments to take
this problem seriously.
Discomfort with male vulnerability in international
lawmaking is not limited to sexual violence. When, on behalf of
a women’s rights NGO, I advocated for attention to women’s
concerns at the General Assembly Special Session on
HIV/AIDS in 2001, I was struck by the ease with which
governments agreed to include our suggested language about
women.16 Women’s vulnerability, and the validity of addressing
14. S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR, 4213th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1325
(2000), available at http://www.unfpa.org/women/docs/res_1325e.pdf.
15. Forty-two percent of female combatants also reported conflict-related
sexual violence. Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Combatant Status and
Sexual Violence With Health and Mental Health Outcomes in Postconflict
Liberia, J. AM. MED. ASS’N, http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/300/6/676.full
(last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
16. The language pertained to women in general. Groups such as sex
workers, in contrast, provoked discomfort and were among the vulnerable
groups state delegates refuse to include in the final instrument by name.
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it in international lawmaking processes, was by that time no
longer contested by policymakers. But as I note below, men,
and in particular those belonging to groups whose vulnerability
to HIV is well documented, receive no such attention.
III. Males Viewed Only in Their Instrumentalist Capacity
Women’s rights NGOs can be credited with advancing
groundbreaking language in international human rights
instruments that includes men and boys in the context of
family, reproductive health, and violence, beginning with the
outcome document developed at the International Conference
on Population and Development in 1994. As important as this
language has been, a close reading of this document reveals
what I have called an “instrumentalist approach”: one that
includes men and boys only in the context of their
responsibility to improve women’s and girls’ health and rights.
While not doubting the importance of addressing the role men
have to play in the realization of women’s equality, I find the
approach, when used exclusively, to be problematically narrow.
For example, the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS (2006)
mentions men and boys only once (I safely assume that,
unfortunately, here as elsewhere, “gender” is used to refer to
women and girls):
States
pledge
to
eliminate
gender
inequalities, gender based abuse and violence;
increase the capacity of women and adolescent
girls to protect themselves from the risk of HIV
infection and take all necessary measures to
create an enabling environment for the
empowerment of women and strengthen their
economic independence; and in this context,
reiterate the importance of the role of men and
boys in achieving gender equality.17

17. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. 60/62, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/262
(June
15,
2006),
available
at
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/20060615_hlm_politicaldeclaration_ar

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss3/5

8

832

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

I recognize the benefit of this framing for drawing
attention to women’s vulnerabilities to HIV, but I find that the
instrumentalist approach, when used exclusively, fails to
account for the ways in which gendered norms operate to make
men susceptible to the disease.18 When healthcare-seeking
behavior is viewed as a sign of weakness, for example, men
avoid clinics, and no one wins.
Moreover, the General Assembly’s refusal to explicitly
articulate the rights of men who have sex with men in the
context of HIV/AIDS, despite pressure from NGOs and health
experts to do so, is discriminatory and dangerous. Silence in
HIV/AIDS instruments about the real vulnerabilities that some
men face risks reinforcing notions of men’s invincibility.
The finger-wagging “should” tone found in instrumentalist
language also risks turning off men and boys who might be
open to other, more inclusive messages about the ways in
which regressive masculinity norms put them in danger. In
contrast, programs like “One Man Can,” run by Sonke Gender
Justice in South Africa, frame the engagement of men in
gender equality efforts as something that empowers and
benefits them, too. The program asserts that “One Man Can:
love passionately, stop AIDS, end domestic violence,”19 and so
on, encouraging men to “to build a movement, to demand
justice, to claim our rights and to change the world.”20
In the spirit of Scott Long’s description on our panel of
human rights law as “creatively norm producing,” can we
imagine international texts that aim to liberate men and boys
from the pressure to live up to a masculine ideal? If not, we
risk remaining stuck with an outdated and unduly limited
model.

es60262_en.pdf.
18. See Jenny A. Higgins et al., Rethinking Gender, Heterosexual Men,
and Women’s Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 435 (2010).
19. One
Man
Can
Home,
SONKE
GENDER
JUSTICE,
http://www.genderjustice.org.za/onemancan/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
20. Id.
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IV. Female Perpetrators are Overlooked
Female perpetration of sexual violence is a particularly
thorny issue for women’s rights advocates to confront, as it
runs counter to the well-established and politically-potent
feminist narrative about men’s use of violence to subordinate
women. This, together with run-of-the-mill gender stereotyping
to which anti-rape activists are also susceptible, might account
for its under-exploration in the human rights literature and the
lack of attention paid to it by human rights NGOs.
Two data points illustrate the phenomenon of female
perpetration. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003,21 for
which I lobbied together with allies from Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, and others, calls for an annual survey
of those held in prison, jail, immigration detention, and
juvenile detention centers. Among other significant findings, of
youth reporting forced sexual conduct by an adult staff
member, 86.1 percent were boys abused by female staff.22
Elsewhere, a 2010 population-based assessment of sexual
violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
found that, of women who experienced sexual violence as part
of the long-running DRC conflict, 41 percent reported a female
perpetrator, most typically a female combatant. 15 percent of
male victims also reported a female perpetrator. (The study
was also notable for finding that 22 percent of all men had
experienced conflict-related sexual violence.) Tellingly, in the
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) article
reporting these findings, the authors note, “the term
interpersonal violence is used in place of gender-based violence
to include all types of violence between men and women.”23
Why so? Senior author Lynn Lawry tells me that the

21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006).
22. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL
VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIES REPORTED BY YOUTH 2008-2009, at 13
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svjfry09.pdf.
23. Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Sexual Violence and Human
Rights Violations with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 553, 554
(2010).
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change was at the behest of JAMA who removed the term
“sexual gender based violence” during its edits, due to
confusion between the terms sex and gender. The authors then
objected in writing, explaining that gender-based violence, an
internationally accepted phenomenon, “occurs to either men or
women”; indeed the findings are significant for demonstrating
exactly this. Nevertheless, the neutered term “interpersonal
violence” was ultimately used. Lawry concludes that the term
“gender-based violence” has been “overtaken by advocacy
groups to push agendas” focused only on male violence against
women.24 The result of this ongoing narrowness perpetuated by
advocates, at least in this case, was gender’s partial erasure
from a study wholly revelatory about gendered violence.
Interrogating the gender implications of the above findings
would seem an important feminist project. Do prison and
military institutions encourage displays of traditional forms of
masculinity? Do women working as corrections officers or
acting as combatants face pressure to perform dominance? How
do males abused by females interpret their own victimization
and what are the implications, if any, for their propensity for
future violence or victimization? Erasure of female
perpetration precludes these explorations. Instead feminism
would do better to “absorb more holistically the experiences of
women who would wield strength, aggression, and violence in
all its forms.”25
The infamous Abu Ghraib photo of Lynndie England, the
Army reservist who gave the swaggering “thumbs up” while
next to a naked, hooded, male detainee forced to masturbate
before her, certainly has much to say about institutionalized
gender dominance. Contrary to the dismissive “bad apple” story
used to explain the behavior of England and her colleagues,
forced nudity was in fact developed by the U.S. military as an
interrogation technique and used in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at
the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba.26 The use of nudity has
24. E-mail from Lynn Lawry to Lara Stemple (Mar. 14, 2011) (on file
with author).
25. Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing
Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703, 704 (2010).
26. See Anthony R. Jones & George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the
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been credited with the dehumanization of detainees that set
the stage for an escalation of degradation.27 And to unpack
what was really going on, we need tools much more
sophisticated than international instruments concerned only
with the sexual violation of women. The torture frame that was
frequently used also felt limited, missing as it does a gendered
lens.
V. Conclusion
I am sympathetic to concerns about compromising decades
of work to tell a story about rape as a tool of male dominance
and female subordination. As Carole Vance observed on our
panel, the anti-violence against women “establishment,” has
done important work on an issue of serious concern, creating a
vested interest in the male perpetrator/female victim narrative.
It is a narrative that continues to reflect reality for far too
many people around the world. At the same time, this
narrative risks obscuring other vectors of gendered oppression
that are also operating, such as violence against people who fail
to conform to gender norms. These are competing concerns that
are difficult, though essential, to keep in balance.
How to do so? Bridget Crawford asked our panel if we
would like international human rights instruments to be sexneutral. For the reasons laid out above, I oppose sex-specific
language that is descriptively inaccurate and normatively
problematic. I am also concerned about the comfort with which
governments address women’s peril while remaining
circumspect about the vulnerability of others. I fear that the
solutions as currently represented in international texts are at
best only partial and at worst at risk of reinforcing the
gendered norms they should instead upend.
But, I do not favor an erasure of gender considerations. I
favor approaches that focus on empowerment, and that move

Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 10
(2005), available at www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2004/intellabu-ghraib_ar15-6.pdf.
27. Id.
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beyond the female victim/male perpetrator focus. I favor
frameworks that make rights to sexual autonomy, to bodily
integrity, to dignity, and to inclusive equality paramount.
Rosalind Petchesky calls sexuality “the matrix of
universality and a viable exit point”28 to move us beyond the
exclusive focus on women’s victimization that was politically
necessary at the moment of Cairo and Beijing. Advocates
aiming to advance LGBT rights, protect exploited migrant
workers, end female genital mutilation/cutting, combat
HIV/AIDS, expand reproductive rights, eradicate prisoner rape,
and advance the rights of sex workers have much more in
common in this regard than their organizational silos might
suggest.
Collaboration across these movements is do-able and has
begun to take place in interesting ways in practice.29
International legal instruments ought not get in the way.

28. Rosalind P. Petchesky, Rights of the Body and Perversions of War:
Sexual Rights and Wrongs Ten Years Past Beijing, 57 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 301,
306 (2005).
29. For instance, a coalition of organizations formed the Raising the Bar
for Justice and Safety Coalition to advocate for the adoption of federal
standards developed by the Prison Rape Elimination Commission. Among
others, coalition members include Gay Men’s Health Crisis, National
Congress of Black Women, Drug Policy Alliance, RAINN (Rape, Abuse and
Incest National Network), National Minority AIDS Council, Just Detention
International, Transgender Law Center, and Women's Refugee Commission.
The full list can be found at http://raisingthebarcoalition.org/members.aspx.
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